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Monitoring Elections
Padraig O'Malley
Padraig O'Malley was a member of international delegations monitoring elections
in the Philippines, South Africa, and Mozambique. These delegations were orga-
nized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), Wash-
ington, D.C. O'Malley's opinions, observations, and reflections on these elections
are entirely his own and in no way reflect the opinions of NDI.
During the past ten years, I have taken part in a number of international observer
missions to elections in various parts of the world. This evening I want to talk
about these in particular — the Philippine elections in February 1986; the South African
election in April 1994; and the Mozambican elections in November 1994 — to see
whether there are features common to all and unique to each and whether monitoring
practices have evolved in new directions since the end of the Cold War.
The Philippine elections were the first to achieve celebrity status, for a number of
reasons, I think. First, they represented the impact of the globalization of the media —
the media were the message, and the fact of an election being observed changed the
nature and context of the elections themselves. Second, it was a high-profile election,
pitting a longtime aging dictator who, let it be said, had achieved legendary status in
many parts of his country, against a homely housewife, Cory Aquino — widow of
Benigno Aquino, a man murdered in 1983 by agents of Marcos as he stepped off a
plane in Manila — returning from a number of years in exile to avenge her dead hus-
band. Third, and perhaps more important in the long run, was that the democracy
movement was beginning to take shape in the mid-1980s, and many authoritarian dicta-
torships were being challenged for the first time by a variety of pro-democracy move-
ments and nongovernmental organizations committed to the development of functioning
civil societies.
One-party states were beginning to come under critical scrutiny from within their
own countries, and voices calling for multiparty electoral systems were being heard for
the first time.
Typically, an election monitor is responsible for assuring that the elections are car-
ried out in accordance with the electoral code or the election laws established by an
independent electoral commission (IEC). An IEC has the overall responsibility for ad-
ministering the election, for ensuring that the elections are violence-free and without
intimidation, for convincing the voters that their votes will be cast in secrecy, for carry-
ing out the counting of the votes, and for being the final arbiter in decisions regarding
votes or groups of votes whose validity has been challenged. In Mozambique, for ex-
ample, an X had to be placed beside the symbol of the party or the photograph of the
head of the party. Even [check marks] in the appropriate boxes were, under the election
laws, invalid, although there was no doubt as to how the voter intended to vote. And in
the end, an IEC has the responsibility to judge whether or not the election is fair and
Padraig O'Malley is a senior fellow at the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs,
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free, as does the monitor. All in all, daunting tasks, especially in countries such as the
Philippines and Mozambique, where the supporting infrastructure is largely absent,
administrative capacity sadly lacking, and widespread corruption rampant at both the
official and unofficial levels, which is, by the way, largely taken for granted — a way of
life rather than an exception.
For the moment, I will distinguish between retail and wholesale fraud.
Retail fraud takes place at the election site. It includes:
1
.
Multiple voting: bringing votes from one district to another.
2. Multiple voting by the individual. As a way of addressing this, it has over
the years been the practice of election administrators to mark the back of
the of the hand or a finger of each voter with an indelible dye. However,
often the dyes are tampered with and in many cases can be easily erased.
3. Helping the old or the illiterate to vote, and in effect voting for them. I
should add that each party usually is entitled to have a number of its own
monitors present in the ballot area. They are in a position to monitor the
actions of the voting authorities and of individual voters and subsequently to
challenge their actions.
4. The issuance offalse ID cards. Making credible duplicates of voter ID cards
has been a common practice over the years, and degrees of misuse vary
depending upon whether voters have to preregister to vote or whether any
ID card will suffice.
5. Hampering people's ability to vote by supplying them with incorrect infor-
mation regarding balloting procedures. In most countries that are holding
democratic elections for the first time, many, and often most, of the voters
are illiterate. For some time prior to the elections, nongovernmental organi-
zations, sometimes the country's IECs, which are often, even if unfairly so,
regarded as a government rubber stamp, and international organizations that
specialize in election monitoring, carry out voter education programs which
try to extend the rudiments of the democratic process and educate voters
how to vote. In this case, you could say that the monitoring itself on the
days of the elections is the last step in a long and arduous process. Making
it difficult for voter education programs is easy, especially in one-party
states where the state and the party have, for all intents and purposes, be-
come interchangeable.
6. Often absent, as well, is the presence of an independent medium, especially
television and to a lesser extent radio. Television is invariably state-owned
and during state elections is used in a blatantly partisan way. Part of the
problem here is that opposition parties do not object since they, too, if they
were in power, would behave similarly. Using the machinery of the state to
influence elections is routinely regarded as one of the perks of incumbency.
Which raises an important point: election monitoring has taken on a much broader
frame of reference over the past several years, and again I would probably use the Phil-
ippine elections as a benchmark. Monitoring is much more concerned now with all
aspects of the electoral process that contributes to an unequal playing field and with the
elimination of barriers which contribute to that inequality. Leveling the playing field is
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now the phrase of the day, and that means ensuring the conditions for voter education
programs, overseeing voter registration drives, evaluating the media for equal coverage,
guaranteeing equal access to the paraphernalia of elections, including consultation in
drawing up the ballot itself, and agreements on what demarcation on the ballot will be
required, how ballots are regarded as being valid; procedures and verification processes
for ballot boxes, ensuring their transportation to the main counting centers, procedures
for counting and for dealing with vote challenges, and reconciliation procedures to
confirm that the number of votes cast at the ballot boxes is equal to the number of vot-
ers verified to have been admitted to the polling station.
Wholesale fraud takes two forms, and many variations fall within the ambit of both.
Among the variations: seals on ballot boxes are tampered with, fraudulent ballots are
inserted and the real contents dumped; ballot boxes full of fraudulent votes are added to
the tally; ballot boxes are lost; ballot boxes materialize out of cyberspace; pirate ballot
stations operate. And most serious, perhaps because it can be carried out on a more
massive scale and is more sophisticated and difficult to detect, is computer fixing,
through which electoral data are altered to produce fraudulent tallies.
In keeping with the advancing technologies of electoral processes, wholesale and
retail fraud today are much more difficult to carry out because of the evolution of more
sophisticated parallel counts or quick counts, as they are often called.
In the remainder of my talk, I will argue that in the post-Cold War order of things,
the function of election monitoring has been altered drastically, that its primary func-
tion is not to ensure a free and fair election, as we define that in the classical sense, but
to ensure that the results produce a government that is regarded by the parties to the
election and the electorate as being legitimate, and that the acknowledgment of legiti-
macy in turn produces political stability. The purpose of elections, especially in coun-
tries making the transition from one-party states to a multiparty democracy, is not to
produce a free and fair result per se, but to lay the groundwork for developing a sustain-
able democracy, so that a form of government and its institutions will slowly pave the
way for party building, capacity building, institution building, and the development of
trust among the major actors who facilitate accommodation and compromise among the
parties.
Democracy is a learned behavior. In formerly one-party states, undemocratic prac-
tices must be unlearned. This does not happen overnight, but is a slow, painstaking
process requiring constant attention and a vigorous, vocal civil society to back it up.
Some other useful observations provide a subtext for evaluating the work of interna-
tional monitoring agencies.
1. There is no "ideal" democratic system.
2. Democracy cannot flourish without the development of trust, tolerance, and
a willingness to compromise.
3. Democracy is about behavior, behavior is based on convictions, convictions
are rooted in values, convictions and values can be taught, and behaviors
can be learned — or, as is necessary in many cases, behavior can be un-
learned.
4. Many African countries were handicapped at the outset.
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5. The globalization of communications reinforces the trends of democratiza-
tion. The fax and the cellular phone are the latest instruments of communication
technology to shape the way in which elections are conducted, especially in
countries lacking electricity.
6. Although a transition is singular to a particular country, transitions, whether
from authoritarian or military or communism to democracy, share many
features.
7. Democracy is not edible.
8. Expectations must be kept in check.
9. In many cases, democracy is the remedy of last resort.
10. Refugee problems undermine democratization.
1 1
.
Questions of ethnicity and tribalism are being more openly acknowledged
and do not seem to elicit the suspicion or defensiveness they once engen-
dered.
12. In most underdeveloped countries, there is a very limited understanding of
the role of a public broadcasting system in a democratic society.
13. A Code of Conduct, to which all parties agree, proved its efficacy during
the 1989 Namibia elections and can be a very useful ancillary tool.
14. International observer groups have come to play a vital role in transitions.
Their presence changes the nature of the process being observed. They both
confer legitimacy and make it more difficult for a ruling regime to cheat.
They inspire confidence in the process, thus encouraging people to partici-
pate.
15. Internal monitoring groups play a similar role and have a similar impact.
Churches, in particular, possess the organizational structures to facilitate
countrywide monitoring networks. To perform this function effectively,
however, the churches must be seen to be neutral, which is often a problem
since they frequently see themselves as part of the larger liberation move-
ment.
16. In a world in which competition for resources has become more ethnocen-
tric than ever, the self-interest of the more affluent states discourages altru-
ism and foreign aid. There is little acknowledgment that over the past
twenty years, authoritarian colonialism, leaving behind administrative struc-
tures rather than nation-states, spawned authoritarian, autocratic, single-
party states skewed by artificial borders and often antagonistic admixtures
of ethic groups, create in substantial measure the convoluted and artificial
politics that have emerged in many parts of the world, particularly in Africa,
often with the most heinous consequences.
Let me turn now to specific elections. I will give the least time to the Philippines and
the most to South Africa for a variety of reasons that I hope will become apparent.
Mozambique provides a further example of where the new center may be drifting.
The Philippine elections in 1986, pitting the poignant Cory Aquino against the ma-
levolent tyrant Ferdinand Marcos, had all the ingredients of a soap opera. This was not
an election about issues but about some mythical bout between Good and Evil, as per-
sonified by the two candidates. Cory, the darling of the West, a newfound celebrity as
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she returned to the Philippines to oust the man who many believed to be her husband's
murderer. There were no issues, as such, beyond the corruption of Marcos's twenty-one
years in office. Indeed, perhaps the one issue that was and remains the issue in the Phil-
ippines is land reform, and since both the Marcos and Aquinos families come from
large land-holding baronies, their positions on the issue were at best perfunctorily dif-
ferent, questions of nuance rather than substance. What made the Philippine elections
unique was the fact that its outcome, in large measure, was determined by the media —
namely the international media.
My own situation at the time will suffice to illustrate the point. I was monitoring in
an area in the far south — Nindanamo — supposedly a stronghold of the Communists.
My three colleagues and I monitored a dozen balloting stations, took frequent sound-
ings from the quick-count people, watched the counting at each of the stations, saw the
parties put their imprints on the waxed seals of the boxes in which ballots were to be
transported to the provincial capital. We followed the boxes and saw them safely to
their destination. All appeared to be in order and, to tell the truth, we were a little disap-
pointed since it is the unstated dream of every election monitor to find massive, large-
scale fraud that will bring matters to a screeching halt. Back in Manila, where we and
the rest of the delegation spent a full day debriefing, few of the forty or so in the del-
egation had found anything more than retail fraud here and there and at some stations
the military stood inside the allowed limits and appeared to pose a rather intimidating
presence.
Meanwhile, however, state television, which had been covering the elections, had
various reports coming in from all over the country. The television link was severed
abruptly when results from several areas suggested Aquino was doing better than ex-
pected.
Immediately, panic ensued as delegations began to ring their homes, offices, and
friends to find out what ABC, CBS, and NBC were reporting, and their reports of vote
rigging became the basis for the conclusion of many delegations, including ours, that
the election was not free and fair. Simply put, we could not reach a conclusion that
might allow for the bad guy's winning. We could not be out of line with what the con-
ventional opinion makers had predicted before the elections: that should Marcos win,
he would have stolen it.
It wasn't until about 2:00 A.M. Sunday morning (January 1986) that conclusive
proof of rigging came in. The computers were cooking the books, which had been
preprogrammed to manipulate the data when it was fed in. No television crew came
upon this, no sleuthing monitor was on the ball. Just a computer operator who blew the
whistle when certain weird results that were counterintuitive began to emerge.
Marcos was greedy. He decided to steal big, thus focusing attention on election data
that otherwise would have been overlooked. Had he stolen small, he probably would
have gotten away with it. One thing for sure: he would not have had to flee the country
in the manner in which he did.
The South African elections had also a lot to do with being on the right side. Any
attempt at overt stealing would have been easily detected since the country was literally
crawling with election monitors, from God knows where, with fleets of television cam-
eras in their wake. In one sense, the results were a foregone conclusion: It was a given
that at the national level Nelson Mandela would easily prevail, the only question being
whether he would get more than the magic two-thirds of the vote that would give him,
in effect, a free hand to draw up the country's final constitution.
118
There were, in fact, delays and irregularities; in some places, ballot papers were
hours late in showing up; in others, ballot stations took it upon themselves to stay open
past the 7:00 P.M. closing lime. Because of inefficiency in administration, some people
stood in line for hours before getting the opportunity to vote. ID cards were easily
forged. Nevertheless, at the end of the voting monitors could only say that the elections
had been violence-free (true), that intimidation appeared to have been negligible (not so
true), and despite some irregularities, the voting, they concluded, was fair and free.
That, too, was the message of the international media and their respective commenta-
tors. Despite the fact that the counting of votes had barely started, the African National
Congress (ANC) declared victory and a triumphant Nelson Mandela was hailed interna-
tionally as president-elect. After three centuries of oppression and almost fifty of the
inhumanity of apartheid, justice was not just done but was seen to be done.
The vote count, however, became a nightmare. Hundreds of ballot boxes were unac-
counted for, millions of votes lost. The ANC accused the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
of vote-rigging in KwaZulu-Natal and the IFP counterattacked with allegations that the
ANC had been involved in voter sabotage. The National Party weighed in with a variety
of complaints about both ANC and IFP practices. The neatly constructed fiction of the
previous days began to unravel. Ominous predictions threatened from the sidelines. And
a desperate independent electoral commission simply stopped counting and gave the
results.
And what miraculous results they were. Everyone was a winner. Buthelezi and the
IFP won KwaZulu Natal with 50.3 percent of the vote. The National Party (NP) won the
Western Cape, the ANC won majorities in the other seven provincial parliaments, and a
very solid, if not two-thirds majority in the National Government — enough to ensure
that the ANC would completely dominate the proposed government of national unity.
Thus the "miracle." But let us look at it in a little more detail.
• First, the Record of Understanding signed between the African National
Congress and the National Party in September 1993 signaled that the
transfer of power had begun. From that point on, the ANC and NP
brokered the process — the other parties were left to follow or to
marginalize themselves.
• The Inkatha Freedom Party, until the last minute, said it would not
participate in the elections. In KwaZulu-Natal this was of particular
significance, since the political rivalry between the ANC and the IFP in
the region was ferocious, violent, and to a large extent uncontrollable.
In the weeks leading up to the election, as efforts to entice the IFP to
become part of the process increased, violence escalated at exponential
rates in Natal. Were the IFP not to participate in Natal, thus giving the
province to the ANC by default, civil war would occur in Natal, which
would spread along the Eastern Reef. But equally as troubling was the
fact that if the IFP did contest the election and lose in KwaZulu-Natal,
Buthelezi would not accept the results and once again, the specter of
civil war would loom. It was apparent to the leadership of the ANC that
should the IFP fail to win in Natal and scream "fraud," Buthelezi would
reject the legitimacy of the results with all the tumult that would
follow. Indeed, the ANC in the region threatened to go to court to have
the results invalidated, but the national leadership made a decision:
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better have Buthelezi in the tent — not to finish Lyndon Johnson's
famous adage. The alternative: civil war in Natal, an Angola/
Mozambique scenario that would ensure that little — very little —
foreign investment would come the way of South Africa. It would only
prove that, as many had predicted, South Africa would go the way of
the rest of Africa. Hence stability became the overriding consideration.
A similar logic applied to the Western Cape, although it is clear enough that the
colored vote there swung behind the NP, one of the striking ironies of history: you side
with your oppressor because, as bad as he has been, you fear that his successor, the
multitude of the oppressed, might be even more oppressive . . .
The "we-all-win" result conveyed legitimacy to the process.
Hence, South Africa could put forward the new South Africa as the model of a state
making a successful political transition, from the Old Order to the New.
Since April 1994, when the elections took place, I have spoken to the most senior
people in the African National Congress, the former National Party government, and the
IFP To a person, they deny that a formal deal was struck in a smoke-filled or, probably
these days, a smoke-free room. But, then, on the other hand, no one will deny that in-
formal understandings emerged, particularly that one set of results would plunge South
Africa into an Angola/Mozambique situation with all the horrible consequences that
would entail. Thus, sharing, allowing all sides a stake in winning and a vindication of
their own positions as pronounced in the past, would give the new governments, both
regional and national, legitimacy. In this sense, a result that produced a stable govern-
ment accepted by the people, that is, a government whose legitimacy was accepted, was
far more important than one which was free and fair.
This trend toward legitimacy and stability, at the expense of other considerations,
began to emerge in the late 1980s when international monitoring teams would often
find themselves at the short end of the stick when the rival political parties that had
fought the elections refused to accept their adjudications and took to boycotting Parlia-
ment or engaging in armed resistance or in other forms of instability.
For the past thirty years, the United Nations was heavily engaged in electoral verifi-
cation and the provision of technical electoral assistance in the context of decoloni-
zation. During the past five years, however, the UN has found itself, somewhat to its
own surprise, continuously involved in the business of free and fair elections. The
Namibia experience, followed by the UN's success in electoral verification in Haiti and
Nicaragua, created a catalytic effect. The democratic ideal had received a new vitality
from world events, and the UN has been recognized as a viable operational mechanism
for the development and support of that idea.
In late 1991, a major debate began about the standards that the UN should uphold,
and the kind of circumstances in which it should become involved, so as to strengthen
national integrity, self-determination, and independence rather than to undermine them.
The General Assembly adopted an important resolution — Resolution 46/137 of
December 17, 1992 — which deals with the various types of UN assistance with regard
to the holding of free and fair elections. It emphasizes that all states enjoy a sovereign
equality and that each state, in accordance with the support of its people, has the right
to truly choose and develop its political, social, economic, and cultural systems. It also
recognizes that no single political system or electoral method is equally suited to all
nations and their peoples. It recognizes that the efforts of the international community
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to enhance the effectiveness of the principles of periodic and genuine elections should
not call into question each nation's sovereign rights, in accordance with the will of its
people, freely to choose and develop its political, social, and cultural systems, whether
or not they conform to the preferences of other states.
The assembly also declared that determining the will of the people requires an elec-
toral process that provides all citizens with an equal opportunity to become candidates
and to present their political views.
In more recent years, the UN has advanced criteria under which it will undertake to
engage in electoral verification in an independent state.
1
.
The situation should have a clear international dimension.
2. The monitoring of an election or referendum should cover the entire elec-
toral process in order to secure the conditions of freeness and fairness, and
impartiality.
3. A UN presence in the electoral process at a critical point in a state's political
life should be sought by the state in question.
4. There should be approval by the component organ of the UN.
As has become increasingly clear over the last several years, however, the UN has
more than a lack of abundant resources. Member-states, now that the Cold War is over,
use the UN to advance policies that benefit their own narrow interests, and while all
give lip service to the principles for UN participation in elections in member or about-
to-be-member countries, few will follow up with the resources required to make the UN
presence little more than a gesture of impotence.
Problems are compounded when the ruling party takes exception to a UN presence
or only agrees to it under a great deal of international pressure. The political parties that
are not in power want an effective monitoring presence. They are profoundly suspicious
of the intention of their governments.
This almost always weakens the position not only of the UN but of all international
monitors. Monitoring, not surprisingly, works best when all parties give their fulsome
support to it. It works far less well when a dominant government refuses to empower it,
and it works worst when one party or another does not accept the electoral results or the
rulings of internal and external monitoring agencies.
Some Illustrations
Under international pressure, President Daniel Arap Moi, leader of the Kenyan African
National Union (KANU), scheduled multiparty elections for December 1992. They
were the country's first freely contested elections since independence from Britain in
1963. Many observers, however, were of the opinion that resistance to the process of
democratization made free and fair elections impossible. The Electoral Commission.
the body mandated to register voters and to administer the election process, consisted
solely of members nominated by Moi without the advice or counsel of, or even consul-
tation with, the opposition. The government also refused to involve opposition parties in
formulating rules governing the transitional process. Instead, the KANU-dominated
Parliament passed an amendment which provided that the president had to be elected by
majority vote and by at least 25 percent of the vote in at least five of the country's eight
provinces, an arrangement that gave Moi a decided edge. In the elections held on
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December 29, 1992 , Moi was returned to office and won a comfortable margin in Par-
liament. Although fifteen of his twenty-one cabinet members were defeated, with the
opposition split among three parties, Moi won reelection with only 36.7 percent of the
votes (another legacy of the British majoritarian system).
Immediately, citing what they called across-the-board cheating and vote-rigging,
leaders of Kenya's three strongest opposition parties announced that they would not
accept the outcome of the elections. But theirs was a hollow opposition, distinctly lack-
ing people power, and Moi, it could be clearly seen, had absolutely no intention of
stepping down or of holding new elections. Moreover, the specter of civil war prior to
the elections' well-armed and organized members of the minority Kalenzins, President
Moi's ethnic group, which during his tenure had become the country's dominant elite,
mounted a series of attacks against largely defenseless members of larger ethnic groups,
the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luyha. Traditionally in Kenya, ethnic divisions overlap and polar-
ize divisions. The international interest was clear. Internal unrest in Kenya would un-
doubtedly escalate into further destabilization in a region already badly fragmented and
divided. Hence, as The Economist reported on February 6, 1993, "International observ-
ers, after some hemming and hawing, decided that the polls were tilted towards Mr. Moi
and KANU, but that the results, nevertheless, roughly represented people's will."
Many Africans were disillusioned with the performance of electoral observers in the
Kenyan elections. In an acerbic commentary, Africa Week said:
Despite allegations of poor administration, incidence of rigging and malpractice
and electoral irregularity, the international monitoring teams seem unanimously
prepared to accept the election results, despite the fact that they were never free and
fair. What is most remarkable is that the positions of the observers have been varied
and often contrary. What the whole process of monitoring has shown is the double
standard that some of the observers are prepared to uphold. They seem to abandon
the very principles they are supposed to use as yardsticks for determining whether
elections are fair and free. The particular positions taken by some observers now
raise crucial questions over the involvement of external observers and whether they
have been or can be seen to be impartial.
What in fact was happening was that the rules of the game were changing, and they
were to find their most finely honed moment during the elections in Mozambique when
the government party FRELIMO, led by President Joaquin Chissamo, squared off
against the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), led by Afonso Dhlakama.
Despite the fact that RENAMO pulled out of the election on the first day of balloting, a
third day was added to make up for the lost first day when logistical problems in terms
of getting ballots to polling stations were overwhelming, when different parts of the
country continued to vote into the night on the second day, but only in areas where
there was electricity, when counting took almost three weeks to complete. The results
indicated that Chissamo had beaten Dhlakama, but that the margin of victory for
FRELIMO was less in the National Assembly. Chissamo was prepared to offer a power-
sharing government of sorts to bring about national reconciliation. Dhlakamo declined
this offer, but more important, he said he would accept the results, ensuring the legiti-
macy of the government and stability. Only then did international observers declare the
election to be free and fair.
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To wind up, there were presidential elections in fifteen sub-Saharan Africa countries
between 1990 and 1992. In seven of them, elections were seen as being free and fair. In
six countries, the exception being Angola, the incumbent was ousted and the opposition
accepted the results. In four other countries, elections were not seen as free and fair,
incumbents clung to power, and the opposition parties did not accept the legitimacy of
the results. In short, in only one state, Angola, was the incumbent seen by international
monitors to have been freely and fairly elected while the opposition vociferously and
violently rejected the results, and every attempt since then to end the civil war has run
into one roadblock or another.
In six countries the incumbent was ousted, and in eight countries the incumbent was
returned to power under either dubious or fraudulent electoral circumstances. Moreover,
opposition parties accepted the legitimacy of the results only in the six states that
ousted the incumbents, providing an unsettling precedent of sorts: it would appear that
in newly formed multiparty democracies, opposition parties will accept the legitimacy
of the electoral results only if the incumbent is defeated. Elections in themselves are,
therefore, not barometers of the prospects for a smooth transition to democracy.
One final thought, from the African writer Makua wa Mutua: "[In post-colonial
countries], due to centuries of abuse and deprivation, it has been difficult and in some
cases impossible to develop and sustain practices that enhance and internalize concepts
of a functioning democracy." 5*
This speech was originally delivered at the Distinguished Lecture Series, University of
Massachusetts Boston, December 12, 1994.
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Addendum — January 1999
Paradigm Shifts?
I
n a recent column, "No Repeat of Our Glorious 1994," one of South Africa's most
prominent political commentators, Kaiser Nyatsumba wrote,
Many will take memories of those special days to their graves. There they were, on
April 27 and 28, 1994, maids standing with their madams, labourers standing with
their masters, all eager to cast a vote in our democratic national elections.
Those were probably the most cathartic days in the history of this country.
South Africa is again facing an election in a matter of months.
Although we will not be a typically "normal" country for a few more years, our
politics have nevertheless begun to lose their "special" image. There may well be
many in politics today who believe they are there to serve the nation, but by and
large many others are there to make a living. To them, politics is an occupation like
any other, and some will lie and cheat to remain in office to reap the benefits of
being in parliaments or government.
A second observation came from Albie Sachs, one-time activist and presently a
member of the country's Constitutional Court. "We were able to achieve a miracle, but
we can't achieve the achievable."
When the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was supposed to open
the floodgates to the horrors of apartheid past and by some mysterious alchemy achieve
reconciliation in South Africa, released its final report at the end of October 1998, it
was damned by all political parties. Its full repercussions are only beginning to sink in.
Truth, it did reveal; but it is an incomplete truth. Justice remains very much in the bal-
ance. Reconciliation is a far cry.
Ironically, the attempt of the African National Congress (ANC) to block publication
of the report diverted attention from its more serious findings concerning the modus
operandi of apartheid itself, and the commission's unequivocal emphasis on the culpa-
bility of successive National Party governments and its all-too-willing surrogates in
every sector of South African society.
For President Mandela, the responses the report elicited, especially from the ANC,
must have been especially disappointing. He devoted the better part of his presidency to
trying to bring about reconciliation between blacks and whites, often to the point where
he was criticized by some blacks for paying more attention to ameliorating the fears of
whites than with ameliorating the inequities blacks had suffered.
But President Mandela wanted to put in place the foundation stones for a nation, not
to settle scores or seek retribution. The TRC has not brought about reconciliation in the
here and now. Reconciliation is a process, not an instantaneous epiphany. It is not a
once-over, an ending to something, a closing of the books. Rather, it is the beginning of
something new, the opening of a new book that can only grow out of a process that
begins with catharsis, engenders anger, invites recrimination, leads to reflection, genu-
flects to the need for acknowledgment, provides the road map for the way to healing,
again a painful exploration, and reconciliation, again not a final closing of the wounds,
but a mutual tending to each other's wounds.
When he retires from office sometime next year, Mandela will leave a South Africa
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full of contradictions, with enormous social and political challenges to overcome, a
South Africa still in the process of transformation, a South Africa not yet out of the
woods, not yet one in which democracy has fully taken root, although the vine is ripen-
ing.
If one were to finger the greatest failure of the Mandela years, it would perhaps
come down to something very simple: the ANC simply underestimated the task it faced.
Indeed, the nature and dimensions of the task itself, requiring that it transform itself
almost overnight from liberation movement to government were overwhelming, and the
ANC, not surprisingly, was unable to deliver on the promises it had made to the people.
And it learned, too, that the learning curve is steep. As a result many blacks became
disappointed with the government, and in time that disappointment has turned to some
disillusionment.
According to recent surveys, this is not going to result in African voters voting for
another party in the 1999 elections.. There is in effect no other party. Voters, if they
wish to register their disapproval, will express their disillusionment by staying at home,
resulting in a lower voter turnout. The drop in voter turnout will be the significant
indicator of blacks' dissatisfaction with government, not the percentage of the vote the
ANC receives.
Even though it has enjoyed an overwhelming majority in Parliament, the ANC is
supersensitive to criticism, seeing it as racially motivated, and a thinly veiled insinua-
tion that blacks simply aren't up to the task of governing. This hypersensitivity in turn
has bred hubris — a propensity to dismiss all criticism, justified or not, an axiomatic
response that everything that has gone wrong is somehow linked to the "legacy of apart-
heid," and that whites who draw attention to such things are apartheid fellow-travelers
in drag.
Indeed, so convincing did this morally unanswerable response become for every
failure that the government succumbed to its own propaganda. In such circumstances
there was no need for accountability. The ANC merely trots out the apartheid mantra,
and tells the opposition to go stuff it.
Because Parliament is so firmly under the thumb of the ANC, government is immune
from criticism from ANC MPs. There are, of course, free-spirited and open debate, and
ongoing clash of personalities; some of the most policy-directed exchanges come from
ANC portfolio committees whose ANC members frequently cross swords with other
ANC members and express whatever opinions they want to. But there is no faulting of
the ANC. Never hand ammunition to the apartheid opposition. The fact that all mem-
bers of the opposition have abandoned any form of apartheid or ceased to be advocates
on its behalf is irrelevant.
If ANC members find fault with government actions, they must channel their criti-
cisms through party structures — behind closed doors. Public criticism is equated with
"behavior bringing the party into disrepute" and the critic is subject to "disciplinary
measures."
Although not by any measure a one-party state, South Africa is, and will remain for
the foreseeable future, a one-party dominant democracy. Nor is this necessarily a bad
thing during a period of transition when the government is called on to engineer funda-
mental and radical reform at all levels of society in order to undo the apartheid arrange-
ments, attitudes, structures, and social/public/cultural hierarchies that permeated the
country's fabric.
But whatever disillusionment blacks may feel, it never extends to Mandela himself.
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He is above reproach. Even in matters that properly fall within his domain, if things
don't work out the way blacks expect them to, they criticize the government, but never
Mandela. Blacks make a very clear distinction between Mandela and the government.
Whites do not. Indeed, it often seems they go to the opposite extreme: everything that is
found wanting in government — and among whites the litany is almost endless — they
put at the doorstep of Mandela.
Though he is revered abroad, whites — perhaps more accurately, older whites —
have never warmed to Mandela. They may respect him, have a grudging admiration for
the way in which he has destigmatized South Africa in the international arena; they may
take pride, perhaps, in the acclaim with which he is received in other countries to the
degree that the acclaim reflects favorably on South Africa; they may even have grown
fond of him as he edges toward retirement, but there is nothing about him that would
impel them to refer to him as Madiba, or even affectionately as the "old man."
And for all his efforts to assuage their fears, to assure them that their remaining in
South Africa is crucial to the country's future, that they too are as African as their black
country brethren, they have responded to his courting with wariness. The day he queru-
lously disparaged the increasing number of whites emigrating as not being real South
Africans willing to stand their ground, as being "on the chicken run," and echoed Thabo
Mbeki's "good riddance, "they felt that he had dropped the facade, and that for once, he
was revealing his true feelings — and by extension the true feelings of blacks — toward
whites. Which, if one considers that their most consuming fear a few years earlier had
been that once blacks "took over" they would turn on whites and treat them in the same
way whites had treated blacks for decades, might be regarded as a giant leap forward.
The Mandela Legacy (1)
Mandela is the country's founding icon, the embodiment of all that is noble in the hu-
man spirit, a leader who never forgot where he came from — a prison. He gives black
people a profound sense of pride, something they had never experienced; he imbues
them with a dignity that allows them to rise above the often miserable conditions under
which they live; he freed them from the oppression they had imposed upon themselves
— the oppression of self-imposed victimhood, the excuse for refusing to empower one-
self. Every nation that emerges out of the vicissitudes of historical forces, often imper-
sonal and accompanied by conflict and carnage, needs some one person to embody
what that struggle for an elusiveness called freedom was about; people need a personal
embodiment of what the sacrifices were for, especially when the benefits of freedom are
themselves both elusive and often illusory.
One must, therefore, make a distinction between the performance of Mandela as
president of South Africa and the performance of the ANC-led government.
The Mandela Legacy (2)
Mbeki, the deputy president, must step into the shoes of a man whose shoes are too big
to fill. Mbeki himself would be among the first to admit this. Greatness is an intangible:
impossible to define, impossible not to recognize.
Four questions arise.
• What is the Mandela legacy?
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• What is the state of the nation Mbcki will inherit?
• What stale is the psyche of the country in?
• What must Mbeki do to address the manifold problems the country
faces, not all of which arc of its own making, and not all of which can
be dealt with by the actions of a sovereign nation when globalization
has curtailed freedom of unilateral action on the part of sovereign
nations, and more important its efficacy; when sovereign nations,
especially the smaller and less powerful ones, are, in many respects,
spectators at rather than participants in the global chess game?
And finally, what context must be used to evaluate South Africa's successes or fail-
ures in the future?
This addendum is hardly the place to examine these questions in detail, but they
present the broad parameters of the kinds of questions that would engage us as we get a
better understanding of the kinds of travails that societies emerging into the sunlight of
democracy have to put to themselves.
In the Philippines, Cory Aquino's "people's revolution" spluttered and collapsed
amid the institutional corruption that characterizes much of Filipino society. The land
barons tenaciously opposed agrarian reform. Aquino, under the benevolent custody of
General Ramos, the army chief of staff, spent much of her time dodging coup attempts;
Ramos succeeded Aquino as president, and in 1998, Joseph Erap Estrada took over
from Ramos. The elections attracted little attention. The Filipinos had had their fifteen
minutes on the world stage, and had the good grace to bow out gracefully. The late
Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda, she of the two thousand pairs of shoes, continue
to fascinate the populace, and after nearly ten years it seems the $850 million recovered
from Marcos's kleptocracy will be split, with 75 percent going to the government and
25 percent to the Marcos family, who still maintain a powerful and entrenched position
in Filipino society and politics. In short, little has changed, and democracy is often
more honored in campaign promises to "clean up the mess," promises of "pro-poor"
policies rather than in parliamentary process. But the economy, although battered by the
Asian financial crisis, weathered the financial storms to a far more successful degree
than many of its more highly touted neighbors, which perhaps illustrates the maxim that
when you have little to lose, you are in a far better position to be resilient in the face of
adversity.
Closer still to ground zero are the Mozambicans, who share the distinction with
Bangladesh of being number one in terms of the World Misery Index. Yet Mozambique
plods on, stoicism born of ineffable suffering. You can still buy off a customs guard
with a copy of Playboy magazine, though one often wonders who is getting the better of
the deal.
In local elections in June 1998, the two major opposition parties, RENAMO and the
United Democratic Movement, called a boycott. Only 15 percent of the eligible voters
cast ballots. The most notable result was the emergence of informal civil society groups
that successfully contested these elections supporting independent candidates. In some
parts of the country, including Maputo, they amassed over 30 percent of the vote.
FRELIMO, which has been in power for more than twenty-three years, nineteen of
which were spent ruling in a one-party state, is seen by the other parties as the "ruling
party" and the state, since all organs of authority at all branches of government — legis-
lative, executive, and judicial — remain firmly within its jurisdiction.. There is little
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confidence in the political system on the part of the opposition parties.
Elections for president and the National Assembly will be held in 1999. No one is
holding his or her breath, least of all the opposition parties.
Elections are also due to take place in South Africa in 1999. The bad news for the
ANC is that it appears to be losing support, hardly surprising given the levels of unem-
ployment and crime and the spillover effects of the Asian crisis on the economy. The
good news for the ANC is that fast as it is losing support, all opposition parties are
losing support at an even more alarming rate. For the ANC it is a win-win situation. To
consolidate its African base, old enemies, the ANC and the IFP, are talking a voluntary
coalition with a deputy presidency or a like honor for Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi,
head of the IFP and for years during the struggle the ANC's personification of collabo-
ration with the apartheid regime. When the TRC found that Chief Buthelezi was indeed
a state collaborator and behind hit squads that targeted the ANC in the 1980s and 1990s,
the ANC pooh-poohed the commission's findings and went ahead with its plans for a
grand alliance. De Klerk, of course, is gone, pilloried in the end by his own people for
having sold them out. The National Party, now renamed the New National Party, has
imploded, and the diminishing white vote has nowhere to go, except perhaps, like much
else in white South Africa, to the oblivion of political irrelevance.
As we go to press, the New National Party and the Democratic Party, a party of
white liberals, have gone to court, charging that the government's requirement that
voters cannot vote unless they are in possession of a bar-coded ID card, which they
claim millions of blacks do not possess and are thus being disenfranchised. Unless re-
solved, the matter could delay the elections.
There are many ways of looking at the changes taking place in the three countries
under discussion. Each way will yield a different set of conclusions, because each be-
gins from a different set of starting points.
What is perceived as a learning curve by some is labeled mismanagement by others.
The constant emphasis on consultation is dismissed as indecision by some, as a neces-
sary component of nation building by others. What is harshly condemned as corruption
by some is excused as an almost obligatory sense of duty by others.
Traditions clash; values differ; notions of civil society vary; deference to authority is
rejected by some and overemphasized by others.
In short, none of the countries lend themselves to easy definition. *«•
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